Updated February 20, 2001
David M. Heger
Policy Analyst
National Violence Against Women Prevention Research Center
University of Missouri—St. Louis
In Morrison, Justices Take Away a Woman's Right to
Sue
In September 1994, Christy Brzonkala, then a freshman
at Virginia Polytechnic Institute ("Virginia Tech"), was allegedly gang
raped by fellow students Antonio Morrison and James Crawford. More than
a year after the incident, Ms. Brzonkala brought suit against the two
men in federal court, a right afforded her by the Violence Against Women
Act of 1994. The Civil Rights Remedy, which is found in Section 13981
of the 1994 Act, establishes a federal cause of action "for victims
of crimes of violence motivated by gender." The provision allows women
to recover "compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory
relief" from their attackers. On May 15, 2000, a divided Supreme Court
decided in United States v. Morrison to strike down the Civil
Rights Remedy, stating that Congress had overreached its authority in
attempting to regulate gender-related violence.
Ms. Brzonkala first sought justice under Virginia Tech's
disciplinary system and sexual assault policy; however, this course
of action ultimately proved unsuccessful for her. During the proceedings,
Mr. Morrison admitted to having sexual contact with Ms. Brzonkala despite
her having told him "no" twice. He was found guilty of sexual assault
and suspended by the school. Mr. Morrison's offense was later reduced
on a technicality and he was allowed to return to the university. (Mr.
Crawford produced an alibi witness and the school found insufficient
evidence to punish him.)
Ms. Brzonkala next turned to the federal court system,
filing suit against Mr. Morrison and Mr. Crawford under Section 13981
of the Violence Against Women Act. (Ms. Brzonkala also brought suit
against Virginia Tech, claiming the school's handling of her sexual
assault complaint violated Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments.
The matter was eventually settled by the parties.) Ms. Brzonkala alleged
that Mr. Morrison was overheard in the school cafeteria saying that
he "likes to get girls drunk" and take advantage of them. The District
Court found that Ms. Brzonkala's complaint stated a claim under the
Civil Rights Remedy because Mr. Morrison's vulgar remarks indicated
that his crime of violence was motivated by gender animus. However,
the justices dismissed her complaint after ruling that Congress lacked
the authority to enact Section 13981.
For Ms. Brzonkala and women's rights advocates, a glimmer
of hope appeared when, upon appeal, a panel of the Fourth Circuit Court
reversed the lower court's ruling. On a divided vote, the panel ruled
that the Civil Rights Remedy was in fact a constitutional exercise of
Congress's power. Subsequently, the full Court of Appeals vacated the
decision and agreed to hear the case en banc, or by the full body of
Fourth Circuit justices. The en banc court, in a split decision, affirmed
the District Court's ruling, leaving Ms. Brzonkala once again with no
recourse under federal law.
Because the case involved a constitutional question
pertaining to the authority of the legislative branch of the federal
government, the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear United
States v. Morrison. (The United States intervened on behalf of Ms.
Brzonkala to defend the constitutionality of the statute in question.)
By a 5 to 4 vote, the Court upheld the decisions handed down previously
by the trial and appellate courts. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, rejected Congress's use of Article I of the
Constitution and the 14th Amendment in justifying a federal
civil remedy to violence against women. Although the Court's stance
in Morrison was consistent with its recent trend in holding federal
power in check, the split ruling proved contentious among legal scholars,
many of whom believed Congress had adequately demonstrated the grounding
for its action.
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution deals exclusively
with the powers delegated to Congress. Among those powers is the right
to "regulate commerce . . . among the several states." In United
States v. Lopez the Court observed that modern jurisprudence, or
precedent set by recent court decisions, had recognized three broad
categories of commerce activities that Congress could regulate, including
those "having a substantial relation to interstate commerce." After
four years of extensive inquiry, Congress reached the conclusion that
violence against women has a "substantial adverse effect on interstate
commerce by deterring potential victims from traveling, from engaging
in employment in interstate business, and from transacting with business,
and in places involved, in interstate commerce." This determination
was drawn largely from quantitative evidence. For example, Congress
was informed that "almost 50 percent (of rape victims) lose their jobs
or are forced to quit in the aftermath of the crime." Yet, while recognizing
Congress's substantial body of research, the Court did not find the
Civil Rights Remedy to be an appropriate exercise of congressional influence
under Article I. Justice Rehnquist concluded, "Gender-motivated crimes
of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity."
The Court did not find Congress's utilization of the
Equal Protection Clause (Section 5 of the 14th Amendment
to the Constitution) to pass muster either. The 14th Amendment
gives the legislative branch the right to regulate the states insofar
as a state cannot "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." In examining reports compiled by 20 state task
forces on gender bias, the United States Senate noted that "study after
study commissioned by the highest courts of the States . . . has concluded
that crimes disproportionately affecting women are often treated less
seriously than comparable crimes against men." Congress attempted to
counteract gender bias in the state court system by providing women
with a federal course of action. The Court argued that the 14th
Amendment was meant to address state actions only and that Congress
did not attempt to proscribe discrimination by state officials but rather
violence by individuals. The Court added that Congress failed to present
evidence of gender bias across even a majority of state court systems.
A few years ago, a majority of the state attorneys
general told Congress that violence against women "is a national one,
requiring federal attention, federal leadership, and federal funds."
The Supreme Court did not agree with this assessment. As a result of
Morrison, it is entirely in the hands of the states to make sure
that victims of gender-motivated violence are treated fairly in the
judicial system. Despite the states' poor track record, there is still
reason to be optimistic that women will someday receive equal treatment.
In reauthorizing the Violence Against Women Act last year, Congress
approved $1.5 million a year to train state judges in issues pertaining
to domestic violence and sexual assault. For now, programs like these
are the only hope for women like Christy Brzonkala.
Links
Brief for the United States in Morrison:
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/events/vaw/readings/usbrief.html#commerce
United States v. Morrison Supreme Court decision
on the Web:
http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/99-5.ZO.html
National Organization for Women Legal Defense and Education
Fund analysis of Morrison:
http://www.nowldef.org/html/courts/analofdec.shtml